Mythbusters: Paying For Closers

You've heard it, and so have we. The perennial advice of every draft strategy article campaigns against the early drafting of closers. "Just don't do it," they warn, "you'll regret it for the rest of your life." This may be a little extreme, but if you read those articles, you'll realize that its pretty close to reality. And if you read our articles, you'll realize we dislike this strategy. In Rotonomics preseason analysis, we recommended drafting upwards of five closers, building an early lead in saves, and selling high on as many as you can spare once teams get prematurely desperate for saves. So who was right in their suggestion? Enter Rotonomics vs. The Fantasy Baseball World...

So how shall we look at this myth? Well, since I'm poor I can't do what I had wanted to do, which is to compare end season Yahoo! rankings in 2007 with preseason MockDraftCentral ADP (included only in the premium membership) for the year. Instead, we will have to settle for the same strategy, applied during the current 2008 season. I know, you're probably bummed settling for more relevant information far more statistically volatile.

So looking at it by Tier, the ADP had the first tier of Papelbon, Putz, Rodriguez, and Nathan with an average of 51. Obviously, Putz has been a complete bust thus far, so lets consider the first tier with a bust rate of 25%. The average current rankings of these players is one round higher, at 61. Not one of the four players beat their draft pick, suggesting they were all overrated.

What about the rest of the draft board? Looking at the middle tiers (all but the last) it gets a bit more interesting. The ADP of the middle tiers was about 88, but their average performance was 116, more than two rounds higher. I can't even pinpoint a definitive bust, though Jose Valverde, Huston Street, and Trevor Hoffman all painfully underperformed their draft position. The only player to beat their draft position was Mariano Rivera.

Historically, how have closers been by year's end? Well, in 2007, only two closers should have gone in the first four round (with year end rank below 48), while two more would have gone in the round after that. In 2006, five closers should have gone in those first four rounds, while three more would have gone in the fifth. In other words, the fourth round is fine value for the best closers, provided you choose the right ones. So far it's not looking that way this year, but I expect the rankings will come around.

Finally, how bout those bottom tier closers? Of the seventeen closers not already taken, six have been complete busts, either spending much of the year injured or outright losing their job. The rest? Most (64%) have beat out their draft position, some by as many as three rounds, with Brad Lidge, Kerry Wood, and Troy Percival being some of the best buys. And in place of many of those busts, quality arms have risen to the occasion to be picked off of the waiver wire, such as Jon Rauch, Brandon Morrow, and Salomon Torres.

So the verdict? You are only overpaying for saves if you pick a player who busts. Unfortunately, this is usually the result of an unpredictable injury, as is the case with J.J. Putz this season. But at a bust rate of 25%, its the same as top round players, so bust rate shouldn't be the concern. However, I still don't advise taking top tier closers. Because it is such a small tier, and the demand is so high, the "price" is inflated. It isn't until the bottom tier where the best value can be had. No scarcity means every manager is content just waiting for a late round run, and so grabbing those guys comes at pretty much no cost (ironically, starting a closer run where almost every pick in the round is a closer means you got your guy while that position player you hoped would come around has a very good chance of doing just that). And if you look at the numbers, guys like Brad Lidge and Kerry Wood are easy targets. Plus you can always fall back on the waiver wire or trading for someone's surplus.